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INTRODUCTION
A party contemplating filing an action is faced with a dilemma
when there is an affirmative defense available to the party's opponent
that would be dispositive of the action.' Because the potential defense
t Associate Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law. This Article was
written with the support of a summer grant provided by the College of Law. The author
wishes to acknowledge the helpful assistance of Cavan Berry and Benjamin Swift.
1. For purposes of simplicity, this Article will use plaintiff and defendant to refer to
the parties filing and defending a given claim, respectively, whether filed as an original
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is waived if not raised,2 it would seem that in an adversarial system the
action could be filed with plaintiffs fingers crossed, hoping that the de-
fendant would not raise the defense, either by choice or neglect.3 Nev-
ertheless, filing an action knowing that a dispositive defense lurks on
the horizon could also be seen as pushing the adversarial nature of liti-
gation to the extreme, wasting the resources of courts and litigants on
claims that are hopeless but for a misstep by the opponent.4 In a time of
growing concern over abusive litigation tactics and increased interest in
mechanisms to control such conduct, filing with one's fingers crossed
could be viewed as sanctionable under Rule 11 for violating pre-filing
inquiry requirements5 or violating ethical obligations of candor to the
6tribunal. This tension between the adversarial nature of litigation and
attempts to control abusive or dishonest tactics leave the fingers-
crossed plaintiff in a less than clear position. Courts that have consid-
ered the issue have made it no more clear. They have taken approaches
that cover the full spectrum of possibilities, ranging from condemning
such filing as a "cat and mouse game" subject to sanction under Rule
117 to condoning such filing in order to preserve established burdens of
pleading and proof.8
claim by a plaintiff, as a counterclaim by a defendant/counter-plaintiff, or as a crossclaim,
etc. Similarly, only the term claim will be used. These simple designations adequately
suffice for the discussion herein.
2. See infra notes 14-23 and accompanying text (discussing affirmative defenses and
the burden of defendant to raise the defense or have the court consider that defendant has
waived the right to put on evidence in support of the defense).
3. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING,
§ 3.1:204-2 at 558.3 (2d ed. Supp. 1996) (discussing the reasons why a defendant would
not raise an available affirmative defense, ranging from incompetence, to public vindica-
tion, to a moral or social decision to forego the defense); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 387 (1994) (discussing that a defendant may
not assert an affirmative defense for reasons "ranging from incompetence to a considered
decision").
4. But see HAZARD & HODES, supra note 3, at 558.4 (stating that "[t]he whole point of
the adversarial system is that parties are entitled to harvest whatever windfalls they can
from the miscues or odd judgments of their opponents").
5. See infra notes 35-47 and 61-72 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which
plaintiffs have been subject to sanction pursuant to Rule 11 for filing an action in the face
of an affirmative defense).
6. But see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 387
(1994) (concluding that it is not an ethical violation to file a time-barred lawsuit, nor is it an
ethical violation to negotiate with an opponent about a claim that would be subject to a de-
fense of expiration of the statute of limitations).
7. Brubaker v. City of Richmond, 943 F.2d 1363, 1384 (4th Cir. 1991). For a discus-
sion of Brubaker, see infra notes 35-47 and accompanying text.
8. See In re Leeds Bldg. Prods., Inc., 181 B.R. 1006, 1010 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995)
(stating that there is no obligation of a party to inquire into defenses where the burden of
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The dilemma for the plaintiff, or more precisely, the risk of sanc-
tions under Rule 11, was somewhat diminished by the 1993 amend-
ments to Rule 11 that established the "safe harbor" provision.9  A
plaintiff may escape defendant initiated sanctions by withdrawing the
filed action within twenty-one days of defendant raising a dispositive
affirmative defense and serving a proposed motion for sanctions upon
the plaintiff.10 In a sense, the "safe harbor" provision reflects approval
for filing with fingers crossed by a plaintiff hoping that the defense will
not be raised. 1 Nevertheless, a fingers-crossed plaintiff remains sub-
ject to sanctions imposed upon the initiative of the court under Rule
1112 without the escape hatch of the "safe harbor" provision, 13 as well
as pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927" and the court's inherent powers. 15
Therefore, the underlying substantive question remains unanswered as
to the propriety of filing an action to which there is a dispositive af-
firmative defense. This article will examine that question.
First, this Article will survey and critique the various approaches
taken by courts in considering whether to sanction the fingers-crossed
proof is carried by the opponent).
9. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment (stating that
the amendments were, in part, "intended to provide a type of 'safe harbor' against motions
under Rule 1 I").
10. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (c)(1)(A) (providing for a motion for sanctions by a party to
be served 21 days before filing during which time the challenged document may be with-
drawn to escape sanctions).
11. See, e.g., Pierre v. Inroads, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 769, 774-75 n.9 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(discussing that the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 "tend to encourage such shabby conduct"
in the filing of an action that is obviously barred by applicable statute of limitations in order
to determine whether defendant will raise the defense and then withdrawing the claim when
noticed of defendant's intention to pursue sanctions); HAZARD & HODES, supra note 3,
§ 3.1:204-2 to 3.1:205 (referring to the "safe harbor" provision as "official sanction for the
"cat and mouse game' criticized by the Fourth Circuit").
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (c)(1)(B) (providing for court initiated sanctions commenced by
a show cause order and not allowing for the "safe harbor" escape).
13. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment (explaining
that the rule does not provide for a "safe harbor" in situations where the court initiates
sanctions); see also Progress Fed. Say. Bank v. Lenders Ass'n, Inc., No. CIV.A. 94-7425,
1996 WL 57942, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 1996) (discussing that "[t]he 'safe harbor' provi-
sion of Rule I 1 does not apply when the court rather than a party initiates the consideration
of sanctions").
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994) provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United
States or any Territory thereof who so multiples the proceedings in any case un-
reasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct.
15. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
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plaintiff. It will conclude that none of the courts considering the issue
have fully appreciated or considered the issues involved. Next, this Ar-
ticle will discuss how sanctioning thefingers-crossed plaintiff results in
an adversarial imbalance. A plaintiff is forced to act in a non-
adversarial fashion when deciding whether to file a lawsuit in that
plaintiff must anticipate what defenses might be raised and refrain from
filing if they appear dispositive, even though the available defenses
would be waived if not raised. At the same time, a defendant may seek
dismissal of a suit inadvertently filed in an untimely manner, thereby
taking full advantage of the tactical rewards afforded by an adversarial
system. This Article will then discuss the issue most overlooked by the
courts, whether requiring a plaintiff to anticipate an affirmative defense
in order to avoid Rule 11 sanctions reorders traditional burdens of
pleading, thereby impermissibly altering substantive law. In conclu-
sion, this Article will argue that the better approach is to not sanction
plaintiff for filing the action as either unwarranted by existing law or
not well-grounded in fact, but rather to consider whether the affirmative
defense was obvious to plaintiff. That is, did plaintiff have full access
to facts necessary to assess the merits of a defense, and did plaintiff
know that defendant intended to assert it? In situations where both
questions are answered in the affirmative, plaintiff should be subject to
sanctions at the initiative of the court for filing an action for an im-
proper purpose.' 6 This approach preserves the present adversarial sys-
tem while deterring hopeless, resource-wasting filings.
I. THE AFFIRMATIVE, YET WAIVABLE DEFENSE
The affirmative defense 17 has its origin in the common law plea of
confession and avoidance. At the risk of stating the obvious, it is a
matter not within the elements of plaintiffs prima facie case that de-
16. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 l(b)(1) (providing that by presenting a document to a court
an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that "it is not being presented for any improper
purpose").
17. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c) (providing that "[ijn a pleading to a preceding pleading, a
party shall set forth affirmatively" nineteen listed defenses as well as "any other matter
constituting an avoidance").
18. See 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1270 (2d ed. 1990) (describing Rule 8(c) as a "lineal descendent of the com-
mon law plea in 'confession and avoidance,' which permitted a defendant who was willing
to admit that plaintiff's declaration demonstrated a prima facie case to then go on and allege
additional new material that would defeat plaintiffs otherwise valid cause of action");
Keeler Brass Co. v. Continental Brass Co., 862 F.2d 1063, 1066 (4th Cir. 1988) (referring
to Rule 8(c) affirmative defenses as "derived from the common law plea of 'confession and
avoidance"') (citing In re Rawson Food Serv., Inc., 846 F.2d 1343, 1349 (1 Ith Cir. 1988)).
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feats plaintiffs claim.' 9 It differs from a defense in that it does not
controvert plaintiff's prima facie case, rather it raises matters outside of
plaintiff's claim that, if proven, defeat plaintiffs established prima fa-
cie case. For purposes of this discussion, two aspects of the affirma-
tive defense are critical.
First, whether a matter is an affirmative defense or part of plain-
tiffs prima facie case is a question of allocation of burdens of pleading
or proof.21 If the applicable substantive law allocates the burden of
pleading and proving a matter to the plaintiff, that matter becomes a
part of plaintiffs prima facie case which must be both pled and proven
by plaintiff.22 A matter that is an affirmative defense need not be
pleaded in anticipation by plaintiff, but must instead be raised by de-
fendant as an affirmative defense.2 3 Conversely, a defendant need not
affirmatively set forth in its responsive pleading, nor establish at trial, a
matter of which the burden of proving and pleading has been allocated
to plaintiffs prima facie case. For example, if the affirmative de-
fenses of expiration of the statute of limitations, prior release or res ju-
dicata would potentially bar recovery by plaintiff, it is unnecessary for
the plaintiff to plead that the claim is not time-barred, has not been re-
25leased or is not barred by principles of res judicata. Plaintiff need
19. See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 96 at 607
(2d ed. 1947).
20. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 1270 (quoting Charles C. Clark, the re-
porter for the original Advisory Committee, "the answer must set forth, in addition to deni-
als and as special defenses, any new matter constituting a defense").
21. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 1271 (discussing "defenses not men-
tioned in Rule 8(c)" and how a matter would be determined to be allocated to either plaintiff
or defendant); see also Edward J. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay in Juristic
Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 8-14 (1959) (discussing allocating the burdens of pleading
the elements of claims and defenses).
22. See Robert A. Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases:
Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1205, 1212-19 (1981)
(discussing, in part, the substantive law's determination of the elements of plaintiffs prima
face case and the allocation to defendant of the burden to plead and prove affirmative de-
fenses).
23. See FED. R. Cw. P. 8(c) (providing that affirmative defenses "shall" be "set forth
affirmatively" by defendant); see also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980) (holding in
an action for violation of plaintiffs civil rights that defendant bears the burden of pleading
qualified immunity for good faith acts by a public official rather than placing the burden on
plaintiff to plead and to prove that the acts of defendant were not in good faith).
24. See Cleary, supra note 21, at 8-14 (discussing allocating the burdens of pleading
the elements of claims and defenses).
25. But see infra notes 58 and 95 (discussing cases that indicate that as part of a plain-




only plead and prove the prima facie elements of her claim, while de-
fendant must plead and prove the elements of any affirmative defense.26
Second, because the burden of pleading an affirmative defense
rests with defendant, failure to do so may result in waiver of the ability
27to put on evidence in support of the defense. Therefore, as above,
though recovery by plaintiff may be subject to bar by available de-
fenses, defendant must raise the defense or defenses in a responsive
pleading or risk waiving the right to put on proof of the defense at
trial.28
Otherwise stated, if the substantive law that is the basis of plain-
tiff's prima facie case requires plaintiff to establish elements A, B and
C, and D is an affirmative defense, plaintiff bears the burden of plead-
ing only A, B and C. Plaintiff need not anticipate D as a defense and
plead that D is not capable of proof by defendant. If defendant wishes
to raise D, defendant must do so as an affirmative defense. Generally
speaking, defendant will have waived the ability to prove D at trial if
defendant has not raised D in its pleadings.
29
The above two points are critical for an understanding of the issue
at hand-whether plaintiff should be sanctioned for filing a case when
an affirmative defense exists even though plaintiff has no burden to
plead it in anticipation nor prove it at trial, and the defense will be
waived if not raised by defendant? If the answer is yes, it would seem
that plaintiff is then in a position that an affirmative defense within the
burden of defendant to plead, is essentially added as an element to
plaintiffs prima facie case. Though not required by the underlying
substantive law to be pleaded or proven by plaintiff,3° if sanctions lie
for filing in the face of an affirmative defense, Rule 11 dictates that its
existence must then be considered and evaluated by plaintiff, essentially
making the anticipated affirmative defense a part of plaintiffs prima
facie case. The effect is considerable, for in order to avoid the risks of
26. See Belton, supra note 22, at 1213.
27. See WRIGHT& MILLER, supra note 18, § 1278 (stating that, "[glenerally, a failure
to plead an affirmative defense results in the waiver of that defense and its exclusion from
the case").
28. See, e.g., Layman v. Southwestern Bell Co., 554 S.W.2d 477 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977)
(holding in an action for trespass that defendant's failure to raise the affirmative defense of
an easement prevented defendant from putting on proof of the easement at trial in order to
prevent an unfair surprise to plaintiff).
29. See Belton, supra note 22, at 1213.
30. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 1276 (discussing that it is "technically"
improper for a plaintiff's complaint to contain allegations that seek to avoid or defeat a po-
tential defense).
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sanctions, plaintiff, though able to plead and prove the prima facie ele-
ments of a claim, must nevertheless forego filing its action. This is the
case even though the failure of defendant, either by choice or inadver-
tence, to raise the defense would result in its waiver.
3 1
II. THREE UNSATISFACTORY APPROACHES (YES, No AND SOMETIMES)
Judicial consideration of whether a plaintiff who files an action in
the face of an affirmative defense should be sanctioned has not distin-
guished itself. The decisions contain little reasoning or examination of
precedent. Instead, they largely represent a hasty shot from the hip
aimed at a practice that apparently has angered some trial judges. The
decisions can be groUped into three basic categories: a per se rule for
sanctions (the yes's), a per se rule opposing sanctions (the no's), 33 and
a search for some middle ground (the sometimes).34 None reflects an
approach that is sufficiently thoughtful to appreciate the issues involved
and address them in a satisfactory fashion.
A. Yes to Sanctions-No to Cat and Mouse Games
Six Circuits have considered the question in the past decade. The
most strict line has been drawn by the Fourth Circuit in Brubaker v.
City of Richmond.35 Plaintiffs were sanctioned, in part, for filing defa-
mation claims after the point in time when the applicable limitation pe-
riod had run.36 The Fourth Circuit found such claims to be "groundless
in law."37 Though plaintiffs had apparently continued to prosecute the
claims for a period of time after defendant had raised the limitations de-
fense, the Fourth Circuit said that it would have imposed sanctions even
31. See Belton, supra note 22, at 1207 (referring to the concept of a burden of proof
(encompassing the burdens of pleading, proof and persuasion) as "one of the most impor-
tant procedural notions in our legal system") (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423
(1979) (quoting In re Windship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
32. See infra notes 35-47 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 58-72 and accompanying text.
35. 943 F.2d 1363 (4th Cir. 1991).
36. See id. at 1385. Plaintiffs also were sanctioned for other counts deemed to be
without legal merit. See id. From the outset of its opinion and throughout, the court ex-
pressed great dissatisfaction with plaintiffs' counsel and the complaint filed referring to
counsel as having passed the state bar examination only a few years prior to the filing of the
action and referring to the complaint as "sprawling," "incomprehensible" and "inordinately
lengthy and confusing." Id. Perhaps the court was not in the best of moods to consider the




if plaintiffs had "dropped the claim as soon as the limitations defense
was raised. 38
The Brubaker opinion is troublesome in two main respects. First,
there is no authority cited for the hard-line approach taken. The amount
of reasoning involved is only slightly greater. Though the court seems
to acknowledge that it is requiring plaintiffs to anticipate a defense that
is not part of their prima facie case, the Fourth Circuit brushes aside the
issue, merely stating that "a pleading requirement... is irrelevant to
whether a complaint is well-grounded in law."39 The court does not
seem to appreciate that it may be altering the substantive law by adding
an element to plaintiffs' burden of pleading. What is overlooked is
whether a "pleading requirement" is simply a non-substantive formal-
ity, or whether a pleading requirement reflects the underlying substan-
tive law that, if altered, also alters substance as well as procedure.
40
The only discussion of the issue simply disparages the filing of an ac-
tion in the face of a limitations period that has run as a "cat and mouse
game" 41 in which plaintiffs are filing an action that is dependent for
merit upon the "ignorance of one's adversary." 42 The question, how-
ever, is whether the relative burdens of pleading and proof, reflective of
the objectives of the substantive law, are impermissibly reordered by a
rule of procedure if one must anticipate the possible defenses of one's
adversary and refrain from filing if potential defenses exist.
Second, the Fourth Circuit's sanctioning of plaintiffs for filing an
action that is "groundless in law" overlooks the fact that plaintiffs' ac-
tion was only defeated by a defense that plaintiffs were required neither
to plead nor to prove. Whether a motion for sanctions against plaintiffs
should be considered as a legal or factual inadequacy under Rule 11 is
problematic. 43 It is difficult to see how a claim that meets all elements
38. Brubaker, 943 F.2d at 1384.
39. Id.
40. See Belton, supra note 22, at 1212-13. In the article, Belton explained:
Substantive law thus can be viewed as rules of conditional imperatives that have a
syllogistic form: If such and such, and unless so and so, then the defendant is li-
able ... a rule of law that imposes upon the plaintiff the obligation to plead and
prove all of the "ifs," "ands," and "unlesses" would make it particularly diffi-
cult-if not impossible-for him ever to prevail.
Id. (citing Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L.
REv. 5, 7 (1959)).
41. Brubaker, 943 F.2d at 1384.
42. Id. at 1385.
43. At the time Brubaker was decided, Rule I I required that an attorney, when signing
a pleading, etc., was certifying:
that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable
1044 [Vol. 47:1037
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of a prima facie case is "groundless in law." Nevertheless, it is equally
difficult to see how a claim that has factual support for all prima facie
elements would not be "well-grounded in fact." Unfortunately, the
opinion offers no explanation as to why the court conceptualized the
matter as one of legal inadequacy. Perhaps doing so led the court astray
and dictated the hard-line approach the court adopted. Both the ethical
duty and Rule II obligations to disclose adverse legal authority have
customarily been considered to be a higher duty than that to disclose
adverse facts." But the court was indeed led astray by the specter of
this higher duty.
The Fourth Circuit was concerned that if sanctions were not levied
against plaintiffs' "cat and mouse game," arguments against sanctions
could then be extended to any situation where adverse precedent existed
that would defeat a claim.45 The court reasoned that any plaintiff would
be able to file a meritless action and escape sanctions claiming a right
to rely upon defendant's failure to recognize and raise the precedent.
46
The court missed the point. In the affirmative defense situation, plain-
tiffs underlying claim does not necessarily lack merit. The existence
of the affirmative defense does not destroy the merit of the underlying
case. Rather, in spite of the underlying meritorious case, the affirma-
tive defense negates liability.47 What the court states it fears does not
logically follow, for it is contemplating a situation where the underlying
claim has no merit. That situation does warrant sanctions. The af-
firmative defense situation is very different. An affirmative defense,
when raised, does not cause the underlying claim to be without merit.
inquiry it is well-grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is
not interposed for any improper purpose ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (prior to 1993 amendment).
44. For example, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(3) (1995)
requires an attorney to disclose "legal authority ... directly adverse to the position of the
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel," while Rule 3.3(a)(2) limits the duty to dis-
close facts to situations necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act. In ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 387 (1994) (discussing dis-
closure to opposing party and court that statute of limitations has run), the Committee found
that a lawyer is not "constrained by the rules of ethics from filing suit to enforce a time-
barred claim."
But see Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir.
1986), reh 'g en banc denied, 809 F.2d 584 (9th Cir 1987) (holding that a litigant is not re-
quired to disclose adverse authority and stating that Rule I I is not intended to be used to
enforce ethical obligations that may require disclosure).
45. See Brubaker, 943 F.2d at 1384.
46. See id. at 1384 n.32.
47, See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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Instead, the defense causes an otherwise meritorious claim to be de-
feated, but defeated by the existence of a matter that is .not part of
plaintiff's prima facie case.
B. No to Sanctions-Yes to Cat and Mouse Games (kind o9
None of the circuits have held that there is a per se rule against
sanctions, although a somewhat unclear opinion from the Eleventh Cir-
cuit seems to reject the Fourth Circuit's disparagement of "cat and
mouse" lawyering and approaches that result. In Souran v. Travelers
Insurance Co., the court reversed the imposition of sanctions against a
plaintiff who filed an action on an insurance policy in the face of a po-48
tential affirmative defense of fraudulent procurement. In so doing, the
court stated, "[a]n unasserted defense is no defense at all.",49  This
would appear to be an approval of "cat and mouse" lawyering, embrac-
ing the notion that a party need not refrain from filing an action because
of the existence of a possible defense. The court implicitly recognized
that the allocation of pleading burdens is an important consideration in
what is sanctionable, reasoning that a defense only becomes so when
the party with the burden raises it.
50
The court did directly state that a party should not be sanctioned
for filing an action knowing that an affirmative defense exists.51
Though the context of the discussion and other language perhaps
equivocates from a per se rule against sanctions, the court distinguished
Brubaker because the defense in Souran was not as certain to defeat
plaintiffs claim as it was in Brubaker.52 Nevertheless, the opinion
reads as if the existence of an unequivocal affirmative defense Would
cause the filing of the action to warrant sanctions.53 Such a reading,
however, would negate the court's recognition of the importance of
considering the allocation of pleading burdens in the determination of
what is subject to sanction. How far the opinion intended to go towards
a per se rule against sanctions is a puzzle, especially in light of a previ-
48. 982 F.2d 1497, 1510 (11 th Cir. 1993).
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. See id. (stating that "plaintiffs need not refrain from filing suit.., because they
know that defendants will interpose an affirmative defense").
52. Id. (stating that although the Fourth and Tenth Circuits had imposed sanctions for
the assertion of a claim knowing that it will be barred by an affirmative defense, the situa-
tion at bar was different because plaintiff did not know that the defense was certain to pre-
vail).
53. See Souran, 982 F.2d at 1510 (stating that "in no way do the facts unequivocally
establish that Travelers' affirmative defense of fraudulent procurement would succeed").
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Filing With Your Fingers Crossed
ous dissenting opinion written by its author, Judge Tjoflat.54 In dicta, in
a dissenting opinion six years prior to Souran, Judge Tjoflat appeared to
reason in the same vein as Brubaker, rejecting the notion that an af-
firmative defense of release did not become so until such time as the
defendant raised it.55 Though, his dissent seems to back off a bit from
the strict approach of Brubaker in that it is the failing to inform the
court of the possible defense that is viewed as the offending conduct,
not the filing of the action.56
In any event, the two opinions are difficult to reconcile, especially
with regard to the issue of whether Rule 11 obligations trump tradi-
tional burdens of pleading. Together, they leave it unclear as to how far
Souran should be read as establishing a per se rule against sanctions for
filing an action knowing a possible affirmative defense lurks in the
offing. It is onl, a handful of district court opinions that have adopted
such approach.
C. Sanctions Sometimes-The Great Middle Ground
In many ways, the varying approaches of Brubaker and Souran, as
well as Judge Tjoflat's divergent views expressed in Souran and Irvin,
may be nothing more than a recognition that all affirmative defenses are
not created equal. A defense of limitations or release, as in Brubaker
58
and Irvin,59 respectively, would be rather cut and dried with all relevant
54. See Irvin v. Griffin Corp., 808 F.2d 802, 807-13 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (Tjoflat, J., dis-
senting).
55. Seeid. at811.
56. See id. at 811 n.5 (discussing "counsel ignor[ing] his ethical responsibilities" and
the "spirit, if not the letter, of Rule I I" by not informing the district court that he would
seek to avoid appellees' anticipated defense).
57. See, e.g., Asbeka Indus. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 831 F. Supp 74, 90 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (discussing in dicta that sanctions for filing time-barred claims would not be granted
if sought because a defense must be raised by defendant to defeat a claim); In re Concorde
Nopal Agency, 92 B.R. 956, 958 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988) (holding that "[a] plaintiff is not
required by Rule 11 to determine at his peril, before he files suit, that there is no affirmative
defense available to the defendant"); Oliphant & Jarchow v. Cowhey, No. 88 C 5332, 1988
WL 139351, at *1 (N.D. I11. Dec. 20, 1988) (questioning whether Rule 11 sanctions can be
based on the failure of a complaint to anticipate an affirmative defense and stating that a
"plaintiff can always hope that a defendant will choose not to raise it [the affirmative de-
fense], however vain such a hope may be").
58. 943 F.2d at 1369 (discussing that plaintiff's claim for defamation was subject to a
one year period of limitation but was filed more than a year and a half after the claim ac-
crued without any reason for why the limitations period should be tolled or not applied).
59. 808 F.2d at 803-04 (discussing that plaintiffs claim for products liability stem-
ming from an automobile accident was barred by a previously executed and unmistaken
general release of liability).
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facts known to the filing party unless some exception were available. A
potential plaintiff could well anticipate when a contemplated action
would be defeated if the rather straightforward defense were raised. A
defense of fraudulent procurement, as in Sourvan, is very fact laden and
may not be so clear cut.60 Not only must the defendant meet the burden
of raising it, the defendant must also meet the burden of proving it.
Without all the facts readily at its disposal, a plaintiff may not be able
to accurately predict whether the defense would defeat the action. Put-
ting aside the intrusion upon burdens of pleading, a per se rule in favor
of sanctions might make some sense in the context of a non-complex
defense in the nature of limitations or release. In the context of more
complex, fact-based defenses in the nature of fraudulent procurement, a
rule against sanctions appears better reasoned. Perhaps in recognition
of this tension, the majority of circuits that have considered the issue
have sought to adopt a middle-ground that accommodates the varying
natures of affirmative defenses.
The middle-ground approach traces its origin to the Tenth Circuit
opinion in White v. General Motors Corp., where sanctions were im-
posed, in part, for filing an action knowing that an affirmative defense
of release of claims existed.6' In apparent acknowledgment of the
varying complexity of affirmative defenses, the Tenth Circuit held that
the pre-filing obligations imposed by Rule 11 include determining
whether any "obvious" affirmative defenses would bar the action,
though every possible defense need not be sought out.62 The Tenth Cir-
cuit's approach of sanctionable if obvious is the predominant view in63 6
the circuits, having been followed in the Fifth, Sixth6 and Seventh
Circuits. 65 Nevertheless, two major problems persist with the sanction-
60. 982 F.2d at 1501 (discussing one of several affirmative defenses raised in defen-
dant's answer as being that the insurance policy on which plaintiff based his claim was void
because plaintiff had procured it with the fraudulent intention of having his wife murdered
in order to recover the policy proceeds).
61. 908 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1069 (1991); see also In re
Leeds Bldg. Prods., 181 B.R. 1006, 1010 n.5 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995) (referring to White as
"the source of case authority suggesting that there is a duty on the plaintiff to investigate
into possible obvious.., defenses").
62. See White, 908 F.2d. at 682.
63. FDIC v. Calhoun, 34 F.2d 1291, 1299 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing White with approval,
though not imposing sanctions upon a plaintiff for filing an action in the face of an affirma-
tive defense of capacity to sue).
64. James v. Tura, Nos. 90-3419, 90-3445, 1991 WL 88346, at *I (6th Cir. May 28,
1991) (citing White with approval and imposing sanctions for filing an action despite a
previous release).
65. See Parrish v. Patel, 985 F.2d 563 (7th Cir. 1993) (though not citing White, hold-
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able if obvious approach of the Tenth Circuit.
First, it is not clear what makes a defense obvious to a plaintiff so
that an action could not be filed without running afoul of Rule 11. The
few courts that have sought to discuss, in other than cursory terms, what
constitutes being obvious have taken very different approaches. One
approach has been to view being obvious as a matter of whether all
necessary facts would have been available to the plaintiff to allow for a
determination whether the available defense would prevail.66 The diffi-
culty with this approach (factually obvious) is that it continues to reor-
der the burden of pleading. It requires a plaintiff to investigate a de-
fense that is within defendant's burden to plead and to prove. Plaintiff
must determine whether a defense would be factually supported and
then assume it will be asserted by defendant and asserted successfully.
The other approach to when a defense is obvious, somewhat relieves
plaintiff of having to make that assumption. Therefore, a determination
of obvious constitutes whether all necessary facts are available to plain-
tiff, and plaintiff knows that the defense will be asserted and will pre-
vail. 67 This approach (obviously raised) is by far the most stringent in
terms of when sanctions should be imposed.68
Second, the cases contain a paucity of reasoning, discussion of the
issues involved, or citation to authority. As its sole authority, White
cited a commentary written by United States District Judge William W.
Schwarzer.69 As one district court has pointed out, there is nothing
within the cited pages that directly supports the Tenth Circuit's holding
ing that "sanctions are appropriate where the validity of an affirmative defense was so ap-
parent that a plaintiff could not have advanced his or her position in good faith").
66. See In re Excello Press, Inc., 967 F.2d 1109, 1113 (7th Cir. 1991).
67. See Western Die Casting Co. v. Athearn Chandler & Hoffman (In re Western Die
Casting Co.), 106 B.R. 645, 649 n.3 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that Bankruptcy Rule
9011 [identical to Rule II] does not require inquiry into potential defenses unless the de-
fenses are indisputably valid and plaintiff has knowledge that defendant will raise the de-
fense).
68. See id. at 649 n.3 (referring to the "unusual instance" when knowledge of a poten-
tial defense would warrant sanctions for a party filing an action).
69. See White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d at 682 (citing William J. Schwarzer,
Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1013, 1023-24 (1988)). At the time of writing the
commentary, Judge Schwarzer was Director of the Federal Judicial Center. It is also inter-
esting to note that Judge Schwarzer was the trial judge in Golden Eagle Distributing Corp.
v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984); rev'd 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986);
reh 'g en banc denied, 809 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1987). He sanctioned a trial attorney for fail-
ing to disclose adverse authority in the jurisdiction, reasoning that the brief violated a duty
of candor corollary to the requirement that the brief be warranted by existing law. See id. at
129. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding no duty to "step first into the shoes of opposing
counsel to find all potentially contrary authority." 801 F.2d at 1542.
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in White.70 The commentary is largely a general discussion of what a
lawyer should do to conduct a pre-filing inquiry that is adequate within
the meaning of Rule 11. Interestingly, at one point the commentary
discusses an adequate inquiry in terms of the elements of one's "claims
and defenses," limiting the inquiry to established burdens of pleading.7I
Yet, at another point in his commentary, Judge- Schwarzer does state
that, to be adequate, a pre-filing inquiry should disclose whether an ac-
tion is time-barred, thereby extending the inquiry beyond the elements
of the party's prima facie case.72 Nevertheless, there is no authority
cited for the statement, nor is there any consideration of whether that
approach to Rule 11 would effectuate a reallocation of burdens of
pleading. A reasoned consideration of the issue would seem to require
such discussion.
III. To BE OR NOT TO BE ADVERSARIAL, WHAT IS THE SYSTEM?
At the heart of the Fourth Circuit's strict approach in Brubaker is
the notion that a party should not be allowed to rely upon the mistakes
73
or omissions of her adversary. Therefore, a plaintiff may not file an
action without risk of sanctions in the face of a potential affirmative de-
fense even though plaintiff may have no idea whether defendant intends
to raise the defense. This application of Rule I I seeks to remove the
adversarial edge from determining whether to file an action. A poten-
tial plaintiff deciding whether to file an action is required to anticipate
what her opponent will do and assume that it will be done competently
and successfully. While this may reflect a less confrontational and
more laudable approach to dispute resolution, it causes an imbalance in
the present adversarial system. A plaintiff deciding whether to file an
action to resolve a dispute must approach the decision outside of an ad-
versarial context. Nevertheless, the action would be filed within an ad-
versarial system. It is difficult to justify why this one aspect of litiga-
tion should be, or can be viewed in a non-adversarial fashion, while the
rest of the action remains adversarial.
Brubaker arose in the context of a defense of expiration of the
70. In re Leeds Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Moore-Handley, Inc., 181 B.R. 1006, 1010 n.5
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995).
71. See Schwarzer, supra note 69, at 1023 (discussing that a reasonable pre-filing in-
quiry would, in part, determine whether there existed "available evidence to support the
elements of one's claims or defenses").
72. See id. at 1020 (discussing that an adequate pre-filing inquiry "would disclose
such crucial facts as whether an action is time-barred .....
73. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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statute of limitations. According to the decision, an action can not be
filed without risk of sanctions if the limitations period has run.74 An
adversarial imbalance occurs because the defendant is allowed to es-
cape adjudication of liability due to the inadvertence of plaintiff in let-
ting the limitations period expire. The defendant gains from an adver-
sarial advantage while the plaintiff is sanctioned if seeking to take
advantage of the exact same sort of adversarial "cat and mouse game."
If the dispute were truly to be resolved without adversarial gamesman-
ship, underlying liability and the attendant equities would be the sole
focus of the matter. Yet the system remains one of adversaries and re-
moving that nature from one small aspect creates an imbalance.
In most aspects of litigation, opponents profit from an adversary's
mistakes and oversights. Averments in pleadings not specifically de-
nied are deemed admitted.75 Requests to admit not denied within thirty
days are deemed admitted.76  Claims not filed within the applicable
limitations period may be dismissed with prejudice.77 None of these
examples looks to the underlying merits to determine whether the result
of the adversarial inadvertence is ultimately justified in a moral or so-
cial sense. Instead, a party profits at the adversary's expense. While
this approach to dispute resolution may warrant an overhaul, overhaul-
ing one small comer and leaving the rest intact destroys whatever bal-
ance is sought to be maintained by having the system be adversarial.
Additionally of great interest, is the regard with which the defense
of limitations is held. The courts that have addressed the sanctions
question in the context of the statute of limitations have not questioned
the propriety of a defendant escaping liability merely because of the
passage of time. Most curiously, this has occurred in the context of
looking for a kinder, gentler, less adversarial approach to filing actions.
In terms of a lawyer's ethical obligations, it is not considered unethical
to file an action knowing it is time-barred, nor does an attorney have an
ethical duty to inform an opposing party during negotiations that the
limitations period has run.78 Most interestingly, raising the defense of
74. See Brubaker, 943 F.2d 1363 (4th Cir. 1991).
75. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(d).
76. See FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a). Rule 36(a) also states that a limitation period can be
shorter or longer than 30 days if the court allows or parties agree in writing.
77. See infra notes 139-44 and accompanying text (discussing the somewhat unac-
commodating procedural mechanisms available to dismiss untimely claims).
78. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 387 (1994)
(finding no ethical obligation to disclose to opposing party in pre-filing negotiation that the
applicable statute of limitations has run nor to file the action without disclosing such to
court or opponent).
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the statute of limitations in the face of a known obligation has been
historically disfavored from David Hoffman7 9 to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.80 Yet, the Brubaker approach elevates the statute
of limitations defense to a near sacrosanct level, making it sanctionable
to file an action when the opponent has the potential to raise this some-
what disfavored defense.8' Additionally troublesome is that Brubaker
fails to consider that a defendant may choose not to raise the available
defense for reasons other than incompetence, ranging from a sense of
moral or social responsibility to a desire for public vindication. 2 The
threat of sanctions could prevent the action from being filed and deny
defendant the opportunity to pursue these objectives.
IV. THE REWRITING OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW BY BRUBAKER, AS WELL AS
THE "MIDDLE GROUND"
There is, of course, a fair amount of attractiveness to the notion
from Brubaker that a plaintiff may not, without recourse, file an action
whose only chance of success lies in hoping that defendant will err and
fail to raise an available defense. Hazard and Hodes argue that if there
is no limiting point to the previously stated objections to Brubaker,
Rule 11 would become meaningless.83 A plaintiff, they argue, could
file any action, however meritless, in the hope that defendant would fail
to raise the proper objections.8 4 Therefore, though disagreeing with the
79. See DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY, ADDRESSED TO STUDENTS AND
THE PROFESSION GENERALLY 754 (Joseph Neal ed., 2d ed. 1836) (stating, as part of Fifty
Resolutions in Regard to Professional Decorum, "I will never plead the Statute of Limita-
tions, when based on the mere efflux of time; for if my client is conscious he owes the debt;
and has no other defense than the legal bar, he shall never make me a partner in his knav-
ery.").
80. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1995) (encouraging a
lawyer to render moral, as well as legal advice to a client in determining a course of action
to be pursued); see also, Kenney Hegland, Quibbles. 67 TEX. L. REV. 1491 (1989)
(suggesting that a lawyer's ethical obligation extends even farther than the Model Rules and
that a lawyer should refuse to assert technical defenses such as the statute of limitations
when there is underlying liability).
81. 943 F.2d 1363 (4th Cir. 1991).
82. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 387
(1994) (discussing that a defendant may not assert an affirmative defense for reasons
"ranging from incompetence to a considered decision"); HAZARD & HODES, supra note 3,
§ 3.1:204-2 (discussing reasons why a defendant might forego the filing of a statute of
limitations defense).
83. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 3, at 558.4 (discussing that if the holding of
Brubaker were rejected without a limiting point, that such reasoning would "completely
swallow Rule 11").
84. See id. (arguing that rejecting Brubaker for the sake of preserving the adversarial
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Fourth Circuit's result in Brubaker, they do agree that a line must be
drawn somewhere.8 5 The middle-ground line of cases have tried to
draw such a line by providing for sanctions when an available defense
could be considered obvious.
The concern of Hazard and Hodes for the "swallow[ing]" of Rule
1 1 is overstated. A plaintiff could not, as they argue, file "the most bi-
zarre court papers" hoping for the possibility that defendant would err.
86
Any claim filed must meet the standard of well-grounded in fact and
warranted by existing law, as well as not having been filed for any im-
proper purpose.8 7 It is hard to imagine how "bizarre" claims could
meet such requirements. A "bizarre" claim that is lacking in factual
support, or lacks an essential element of a prima facie case for which
plaintiff has the burden of pleading, would certainly not meet the re-
quirement. A plaintiff could not rely on the argument that perhaps de-
fendant would fail to try to properly dismiss the action to escape sanc-
tions. It is the absence of factual or legal support for plaintiff's claim
that exposes the plaintiff to sanctions under Rule 11.
The affirmative defense situation is unique and very different than
the situation contemplated by Hazard and Hodes. Plaintiffs underlying
claim can meet the requirements of well-grounded in fact and warranted
by existing law. It is only the specter of the defense that, if raised by
defendant, defeats the claim. There is no defect in the claim itself.
What plaintiff hopes for when filing with its fingers crossed is that de-
fendant will not raise a defense for which defendant bears the burden of
pleading, not that defendant will fail to oppose a defect in plaintiffs
underlying claim that causes it to fail to meet the burdens allocated to
plaintiff. Hazard and Hodes fail to recognize that tying Rule 11 obliga-
tions to matters which a party has the burden to plead keeps Rule 11
from being rendered meaningless. The reasoning of the middle-ground
line of cases is deficient for the same reason. But for a lone opinion
from a bankruptcy court, the cases have not considered the relationship
between burdens of pleading and Rule II obligations.
88
system "could justify filing the most bizarre court papers, so long as it remained theoreti-
cally possible that the opposition would bungle or waive the objections").
85. See id, (disagreeing with the result in Brubaker but agreeing that "a line must be
drawn" somewhere so that plaintiffs can not escape Rule 11 sanctions by relying on the ar-
gument that defendant might err). This argument is identical to that used by the Fourth Cir-
cuit to justify the result in Brubaker. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text
(discussing the reasoning in Brubaker).
86, See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 3, at 558.4.
87. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 I(b)(l)-(3).
88. In re Leeds Bldg. Prods., Inc., 181 B.R. 1006, 1010 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995)
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There is a certain facial appeal to the approach of the middle-
ground line of cases that imposed sanctions where the defense was
"obvious." It does seem to make sense that everyone's time and re-
sources not be wasted by the filing of an action that has no chance of
success due to a dispositive affirmative defense. Therefore, the ap-
proach of the middle-ground would seem to be an appropriate place to
draw the line. A plaintiff need not search out every possible defense
available to defendant or search out facts that would not be available.
At the same time, a plaintiff may not ignore the obvious without reper-
cussions. The difficulty, however, is that the defense that is obvious is
not within plaintiffs burden to plead or prove. Sanctioning a plaintiff
for filing in the face of even an obvious defense rewrites the substantive
law underlying plaintiffs claim by adding elements for which plaintiff
is without a burden either to plead or to prove.
This application of Rule 11 would seem to violate the prohibition
of the Rules Enabling Act against modification of substantive rights by
rules of procedure.8 9 It does so by requiring a plaintiff who wishes to
avoid sanctions to account for matters outside the substantive elements
of plaintiffs prima facie case in pleading and filing the claim.9°
Though Rule 11 has been held to not violate the Rules Enabling Act
when its purpose is to deter baseless filings91 and the affect upon the
substantive rights of the plaintiff is "incidental, 92 in the affirmative de-
fense situation, what occurs is more than merely deterring baseless fil-
ings. Instead, by requiring a plaintiff to anticipate defenses in determin-
ing whether a claim is well-grounded in fact and warranted by existing
law, this application of Rule 11 redefines what is a baseless filing. A
claim that would otherwise be both factually and legally sufficient may
not be filed without a risk of sanctions if defenses that are outside the
prima facie elements of the claim are not considered and accounted for.
This is a redefinition of the substance of what constitutes a claim that is
(stating that there is no obligation of a party to inquire into defenses where the burden of
proof is carried by the opponent).
89. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994) (providing that "[sluch rules shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right").
90. See id.
91. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990) (rejecting a Rules
Enabling Act challenge to Rule 11 and stating "[i]t is now clear that the central purpose of
Rule I I is to deter baseless filings in district court and thus, consistent with the Rule Ena-
bling Act's grant of authority, streamline the administration and procedure of the federal
courts").
92. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987) (holding that "[riules
which incidentally affect litigants' substantive rights do not violate this provision if rea-
sonably necessary to maintain the integrity of that system of rules").
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more than an incidental effect on substance. 93 Instead, it redefines the
substance of what is a prima facie case.
Two additional problems remain with requiring a plaintiff to an-
ticipate affirmative defenses to avoid sanctions. First, there is a conflict
with the basic requirements of notice pleading of the Federal Rules. A
pleading statinp a claim need only contain "a short and plain statement
of the claim." 9  A plaintiff who chooses to file in the face of a potential
affirmative defense that the plaintiff believes does not defeat her claim
appears to be required by those courts that have imposed sanctions to
somehow account for why the defense is not dispositive of the action.9
5
Thus, some form of pleading beyond a short and plain statement of the
claim appears to be contemplated, but that is inconsistent with the no-
tion of a claim under the Federal Rules. 96 If somehow not stated as part
of the claim, this anticipation of a defense would be inconsistent with
what pleadings are allowed. There is no such procedural creature as an
anticipation to an affirmative defense.97 The Federal Rules do not even
contemplate a reply to an affirmative defense unless ordered by the
court. 98 In situations where a plaintiff does try to plead in anticipation
of an affirmative defense, such allegations are either treated as surplus-
age99 or are considered as having raised the defense in the event that de-
93. See Business Guides Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc., 498 U.S.
533, 568 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that "[a] rule sanctioning misconduct
during the litigation process will often satisfy the Rules Enabling Act because it 'affects
only the process of enforcing litigants' rights and not the rights themselves') (citing Bur-
lington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 8 (1987)).
94. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
95, See, e.g., White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 1990)
(mentioning in discussion of imposition of sanctions for filing action in face of known af-
firmative defense of release of claim that "[t]he original complaint made no mention of
signed releases"); see also Irvin v. Griffin Corp., 808 F.2d 802, 811 (1lth Cir. 1987)
(Tjoflat, J. dissenting) (suggesting that counsel "ignored" ethical responsibilities to the
court and to adversary by failing to inform them that he intended to avoid anticipated de-
fense of release of claim); Blackwell v. Department of Offender Rehab., 807 F.2d 914 (11 th
Cir, 1987) (holding that failing to mention the existence of a release that could bar a peti-
tion for attorney's fees is sanctionable under Rule 11).
96 See Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 507 U.S. 163, 167-68 (1993) (holding that a
"heightened" standard for pleading in civil rights cases that requires something beyond a
statement of the basic claim impermissibly conflicts with the requirements of notice plead-
ing under the Federal Rules).
97. See FED. R. Civ. P. 7(a) (setting forth the pleadings that are allowed and not pro-
viding for any form of reply to an affirmative defense but providing that "the court may or-
der a reply to an answer").
98 See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(d) (providing that "[a]verments in a pleading to which no
responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided").
99 See, e.g., Alcoa S. S. Co. v. Ryan, 211 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1954) (refusing to rec-
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fendant denies the allegations in a responsive pleading. l °°
Second, if required to disclose information adverse to the client in
an anticipated affirmative defense, the lawyer could be considered to
have violated obligations of confidentiality owed the client.i °i Because
the facts stated in the anticipated defense are not required to be stated in
order to set forth a prima facie claim, 10 2 there is nothing that requires
their pleading other than the threat of Rule 11 sanctions, °3 The attor-
ney then must choose between an ethical lapse and the threat of sanc-
tions.
V. A SAFE, BUT UNSATISFACTORY, UNRESOLVED HARBOR
The troublesome issues surrounding sanctions for filing a claim in
the face of an affirmative defense are not likely to soon find a resolu-
tion in the courts. The advent of the "safe harbor" provision of the
1993 amendments to Rule 11104 would seem to embrace the "cat and
mouse" game decried by Brubaker.10 5 A defendant who raises an af-
firmative defense that is dispositive of a claim and who wishes to pur-
sue sanctions must do so only by motion served upon the plaintiff
twenty-one days prior to defendant filing the motion with the court.1 6
During the twenty-one day period, the plaintiff may dismiss her claim
and escape sanction.10 7 Courts that have considered sanctions subse-
quent to the advent of the "safe harbor" provision have reluctantly
ognize allegations of an anticipated affirmative defense of release); Hoover v. Roberts, 153
F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1946) (considering allegations of due care pleaded in anticipation of the
affirmative defense of concurrent negligence).
100. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CiviL PROCEDuRE § 5.21 at 293-95 (2d ed.
1993); but see CLARK, supra note 19, at 251-52 (suggesting that the goals of notice pleading
would be better served if plaintiff stated allegations that responded to anticipated defenses
in the complaint).
101. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.6(a) (1995) (providing that
a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the client without client consent).
102. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 1.6(a) cmt. 5 (1995)
(discussing that a lawyer is impliedly authorized to make certain disclosures and, specifi-
cally in litigation, to make disclosures admitting facts that cannot properly be disputed).
103. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 387
(1994) (discussing that the failure to bring attention to the expiration of the applicable
limitations period when filing an action does not violate obligations of candor owed the tri-
bunal nor constitute filing a frivolous claim).
104. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 I(c)(1)(A) advisory committee's note 1993 amendment
(stating that the amendments were, in part, "intended to provide a type of 'safe harbor'
against motions under Rule 11").
105. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 3, § 3.1:205 (stating that the "safe harbor"
provision might be said to provide "official sanction" for the "cat and mouse game").
106. See FED. R. Civ. P. II(c)(1)(A).
107. See id.
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found that the provision provides an escape hatch for such plaintiff.'°8
Yet the safe harbor is merely just that, an escape hatch. 10 9 The underly-
ing substantive issue is merely avoided and not resolved.
The specter of sanctions does remain for the fingers-crossed plain-
tiff who has sought refuge in the escape hatch of the "safe harbor." The
1993 amendments retained court initiated sanctions commenced sua
sponte by a show cause order without the pre-condition of the safe har-
bor period."10 A judge feeling that her time, as well as that of the op-
posing party, has been especially wasted by a claim disposed of by an
obvious defense may resort to court initiated sanctions not available to
the defendant."' Court initiated sanctions, however, are limited to a
non-monetary nature or the payment of a penalty to the court and do not
include the attorneys' fees or expenses of the opposing party. 112 Never-
theless, a court could additionally consider sanctioning plaintiff's attor-
ney pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927".. or both plaintiff and/or her attorney
pursuant to the courts inherent powers,"14 both of which could include
monetary compensation for the aggrieved opponent."15  Therefore,
resolution of the issue remains warranted.
108. See, e.g., Pierre v. Inroads, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 769, 775 n.9 (N.D. I11. 1994)
(referring to the "safe harbor" provision as encouraging the "shabby" practice of filing a
claim after the expiration of the statute of limitations in hopes that defendant will not raise
the defense).
109. Dissatisfaction with the "safe harbor" provision has led to efforts, so far unsuc-
cessful, to eliminate it. See, e.g., The Attorney Accountability Act of 1995, H.R. 988, see.
4(a)(2)(A), 104th Cong. Ist sess. (1995) (passed by the House on March 7, 1995, and
placed on the Senate calendar, March 15, 1995, but no further action was taken by the Sen-
ate).
110. FED. R. CIV. P. I 1 advisory committee's note (explaining that "the rule does not
provide a 'safe harbor' to a litigant for withdrawing a claim, defense, etc., after a show
cause order has been issued on the court's own initiative").
11. See generally Leslie M. Kelleher, The December 1993 Amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure-A Critical Analysis, 12 TOURO L. REV. 7, 76-77 (1995)
(discussing the power of a court to commence sanctions sua sponte without affording a liti-
gant the benefit of the safe harbor provision); Jeffrey A. Parness, Fines Under New Federal
Civil Rule 11: The Monetary Sanctions for the "Stop-and-Think-Again" Rule, 1993 BYU
L. REv. 879 (1993) (discussing, in part, a new emphasis under the 1993 amendments to
Rule I I for court initiated sanctions in the form of fines issued to further public interests).
112. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 1(c)(2).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994). For text of statute, see supra note 14.
114. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991); see also, Oliveri v.
Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986).
115. See, e.g., Einhorn Yaffee Prescott Architectural & Engineering P.C. v. Turpin,
No. 94-CV-830, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20546, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. May 12, 1995) (holding
that the court did not have power to sanction plaintiff who had withdrawn its complaint
during the "safe harbor" period, but imposing sanctions of $93,955.19 against plaintiff and
its counsel in equal amounts pursuant to its inherent power and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994)).
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VI. BUILDING A BETTER FINGERS-CROSSED PLAINTIFF TRAP
Despite the problems of apparent reallocation of pleading burdens
associated with requiring a plaintiff to anticipate and account for pos-
sible defenses, it remains desirable to find some mechanism to avoid
wasting the time and resources of courts and parties. It certainly seems
that plaintiffs should not be able to file obviously hopeless actions
without any recourse for defendants or courts whose time and resources
would have been wasted. Therefore, two concerns should be addressed.
First, how to deter such conduct. Second, how to provide as painless an
avenue as possible for a defendant to seek disposition of a claim
doomed by an obvious defense.
A. A New Pigeon Hole-Drawing the Line Anew
With regard to the first concern, the actions of thefingers-crossed
plaintiff should be scrutinized at two points in time: filing the action
and proceeding with the action after the defense has been raised. As to
the time of filing, the difficulty with Brubaker (yes to sanctions)' 1 6 and
White (sometimes sanctions)' 7 lies in considering a claim deficient in
fact or law when an affirmative defense is present. It is not intellectu-
ally sound to treat a claim as deficient when it pleads all elements of a
prima facie claim as determined by substantive law and that meets all
burdens of pleading allocated to the plaintiff. Therefore, the better ap-
proach would be to consider whether the filing is subject to sanctions as
having been filed for an improper purpose, rather than as being unwar-
ranted legally or unsupported factually.118 This approach preserves
traditional burdens of pleading, and at the same time provides a deter-
rence against hopeless filings.
Two conditions should be met before a claim is considered to have
been filed for an improper purpose and, therefore, is subject to sanction.
The filing of a claim in the face of a dispositive defense would be con-
sidered filed for an improper purpose when the two conditions are met.
First, all facts necessary to evaluate the merits of the defense would
need to be known to the plaintiff. As discussed, affirmative defenses
vary greatly in terms of complexity, both factual and legal.' 19 Sanc-
tions are not appropriate when the potential defense is factually com-
plex and not all necessary facts are available to plaintiff in order that
116. See supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
118. See FED. R. Civ. P. l1l(b)(1)-(3).
119 See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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the merits of the defense can be assessed. To assess sanctions other-
wise would force a plaintiff to guess as to the facts and choose between
possibly forgoing a viable claim or running the risk of sanction.
Second, plaintiff would have to know that defendant intended to
raise the defense in the event the action was filed. The adversarial na-
ture of litigation should not be reordered to the extent that plaintiff must
anticipate what defenses are available and assume that the defendant
will raise them. Nevertheless, if in pre-filing discussions, or otherwise,
defendant has communicated to plaintiff that defendant intends to raise
a defense that plaintiff knows to be dispositive, there would be no
proper purpose for commencing a hopeless action, and sanctions should
follow.12°
Of course, one could argue that judicial and party resources are
wasted by allowing plaintiff to file a claim in the face of dispositive af-
firmative defenses simply because defendant has not communicated its
intention to raise the defense. As discussed, to do otherwise creates an
adversarial imbalance.121 Additionally, allowing plaintiff to file its ac-
tion in order to see if defendant will choose to raise any available de-
fenses is analogous to the 1993 amendment to Rule 1 1 allowing con-
tentions to be filed that are lacking in evidentiary support but are
"likely to have evidentiary support" after further investigation or dis-
covery. 122  Both situations contemplate plaintiff filing an action that
may lack merit dependent upon later information or occurrences. It is
only the later obtained information, defendant's raising the defense in
one situation, and plaintiff obtaining adverse factual information in the
other that makes the claim no longer meritorious. But such later occur-
rences do not necessarily render the claim subject to sanctions. 123
Therefore, if both conditions are present, there would be no reason
for plaintiff to file a hopeless claim and sanctions would be appropriate
120. The communication need not be very formal. In fact, in an analogous situation
the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 contemplate "informal notice... in person, or by tele-
phone call or letter, of a potential violation before proceeding to prepare and serve a Rule
11 motion" at the advent of the "safe harbor" period. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory commit-
tee's note 1993 amendment. Nevertheless, it would behoove defendant to make the com-
munication in a form that was documented in the event that plaintiff filed the action after
being informed that the defense would be raised and sanctions were later sought.
121. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
122. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 l(b)(3).
123. See FED. R. Civ. P. I I advisory committee's note 1993 amendment (discussing
that a party is under a duty not to persist with a contention if, after reasonable opportunity,
the required evidentiary support is not obtained, but that the adverse disposition of a claim
containing a specified contention does not necessarily mean that evidentiary support was so
lacking as to warrant sanction).
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for filing the action for an improper purpose. In the event that plaintiff
withdraws its claim within the "safe harbor" when defendant raises the
defense and serves a motion for sanctions, plaintiff should not escape
sanction altogether. If the two conditions are met, the court should
consider whether to raise the specter of sanctions sua sponte.124 Court
initiated sanctions are limited, however, to those of a nonmonetary na-
ture or a penalty to the court.125 This could leave the defendant without
recourse having expended resources in raising a defense it had previ-
ously told plaintiff it would raise. This would especially be the case
where defendant must respond to plaintiffs complaint within twenty
days of service 126 but plaintiff has a safe harbor of twenty-one days
within which it can withdraw its claim and escape party initiated sanc-
tion. 127 It is here that the court's initiation of sanctions should include
sanctions against plaintiffs attorney pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1927128 as
well as against both plaintiff and its attorney pursuant to the court's in-129
herent powers. So doing would provide defendant with compensa-
tion not available under Rule 11 for attorneys' fees and expenses need-
lessly expended.
130
While a plaintiff who has filed a claim with fingers firmly crossed,
waiting to see whether defendant will fail to raise an affirmative de-
fense due to either choice or inadvertence, should dismiss the claim
124. See, e.g., Brubaker v. City of Richmond, 943 F.2d 1363, 1385 (4th Cir.- 1991)
(stating that the court would have imposed sanctions even if plaintiff had "dropped the
claim as soon as the limitations argument was raised"). Under the two-part test proposed
herein, sanctions would not have been appropriate unless defendant had informed plaintiff
of its intention to raise the defense in the event that an action were filed. That is not clear
from the opinion. Nevertheless, plaintiffs apparently did continue to prosecute the action
after the defense was raised. See id. Therefore, it would have been appropriate to sanction
plaintiff for "later advocating" the claim after the defense was raised.
125. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 1(c)(2).
126. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A), (B) (providing for an answer to be served within
20 days of service of the complaint unless service has been timely waived upon request pur-
suant to Rule 4(d)).
127. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 1(c)(1)(A).
128. See Campana v. Muir, 786 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1986) (awarding attorneys' fees and
costs to defendant in action filed with knowledge of unqualified immunity defense that de-
feated all claims).
129. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Acevedo v.
Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 538 F.2d 918, 920 (2d Cir. 1976) (stating, "[hlike an
award made pursuant to the court's inherent power, an award under § 1927 is proper when
the attorney's actions are so completely without merit as to require the conclusion that they
must have been undertaken for some improper purpose such as delay").
130. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (discussing that imposition of
sanctions pursuant to the court's inherent powers are appropriate where appropriate sanc-
tions can not be imposed under other provisions, such as Rule 11).
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once the affirmative defense has been raised,13 1 all may not choose to
do so. A plaintiff who persists in the face of an obvious defense should
be subject sanctions for "later advocating" the pleading for an
"improper purpose."' 32 Treating the situation as either lacking in law or
fact would suffer from the problem of shifting burdens of pleading as
previously discussed, though plaintiff's response to the affirmative de-
fense should be scrutinized to see if it is well-grounded in fact and war-
ranted by law in its own right.133 Of course, situations involving good
faith argument as to the availability of the defense would not warrant
sanctions for not dismissing, but persisting in the face of obvious de-
fenses is conduct that should be strictly scrutinized under Rule 11.
Therefore, the focus should be on what has thefingers-crossed plaintiff
done once the defense was raised, not whether plaintiff should have an-
ticipated the defense and refrained from filing without knowing
whether defendant would raise the defense. 34  Nevertheless, when
plaintiff knew that the defense would be raised, sanctions should follow
for simply filing the action. With this two-pronged approach, the ad-
versarial nature of litigation is preserved, while the concerns of deter-
rence and efficiency are served.
This approach would lead to the same result as that reached in
those courts that have taken the middle-ground of awarding sanctions
where the defense was obvious and have defined obvious to be both
factual knowledge sufficient to assess the merits of the affirmative de-
fense, as well as knowledge that defendant will raise the defense. 135
The adversarial nature of litigation would not be reordered in a one-
131. Adding to the burden upon the defendant is a lack of clarity as to how a disposi-
tive affirmative defense may be raised procedurally. See infra notes 139-45 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the division in authority as to whether affirmative defenses should be
raised by motion to dismiss or summary judgment).
132. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b), (b)(1).
133. See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
134. Courts taking the middle-ground approach have failed to recognize this distinc-
tion. They have scrutinized plaintiff's response to an affirmative defense to see if it is
meritorious, but they have done so to determine whether plaintiff should be sanctioned for
filing the action rather than determining whether the response itself is well-grounded in law
or fact. Examining whether plaintiff's is non-frivolous for the purpose of determining
whether sanctions should lie for filing the action amounts to impermissible shifting of tra-
ditional burdens of pleading. See, e.g., White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 682
(7th Cir. 1990) (discussing that an attorney filing a time-barred claim runs the risk of sanc-
tions if the attorney does not have a non-frivolous response to the asserted defense, rather
than properly examining whether the response itself warrants sanctions).
135. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
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sided fashion, 136 and Rule 11 would not be used to impermissibly alter
substantive law by reordering burdens of pleading. 137 Yet the time of
courts and defendants would not be wasted by hopeless filings. This
represents a more intellectually sound approach. Additionally, this ap-
proach does not put plaintiffs lawyer in the ethical dilemma of having
a Rule 11 obligation to disclose adverse facts relating to the affirmative
defense that may involve a violation of the duty of candor.138 Limiting
sanctions to situations where defendant had informed plaintiff that the
defense would be raised would necessarily mean that defendant was in
possession of information necessary for the defense from a source inde-
pendent of plaintiffs lawyer. Therefore, the specter of sanctions would
not force plaintiffs lawyer to disclose information that should not be
disclosed without permission of the client.
B. A Quick Fix for Defendants
Obviously, a defendant asserting an affirmative defense that will
be dispositive of the action seeks dismissal of the action as quickly and
efficiently as possible. Unfortunately, the Federal Rules are not entirely
accommodating to this concern. An affirmative defense is to be raised
in a defendant's responsive pleading leading to disposition by means of
summary judgment or proof at trial. 139 Neither is a very efficient pros-
pect, especially for a claim that would appear to be hopeless once the
defense is properly asserted. Authority is divided as to whether an af-
firmative defense may be raised by motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, a significantly more streamlined method, 140 though the trend141
appears to be to allow it. The procedural difficulty with utilization of
motions to dismiss is that if the facts necessary to establish the affirma-
tive defense are not apparent on the face of plaintiffs claim and are
otherwise presented to the court, Rule 12(b) necessitates treating the
motion as one for summary judgment, 142 a mechanism that is much less
136. See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 10 1-03 and accompanying text.
139. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
140. See Rhynette Hurd, The Propriety of Permitting Affirmative Defenses to be
Raised by Motions to Dismiss, 20 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 411, 433-47 (1990) (discussing the
division in judicial experience with allowing affirmative defenses to be raised by motions to
dismiss); see also id. at 448-49 (concluding that affirmative defenses should not be allowed
to be raised by motions to dismiss due to an unfairness resulting to plaintiffs in not having
the opportunity to fully respond).
141. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, at 461-77.
142. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) providing in part that:
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efficient, especially when local rules add cumbersome requirements. 143
Additionally, summary judgment is only available when there is "no
genuine issue of material fact" leaving any disputed affirmative defense
for resolution at trial. 1
44
For purposes of this discussion, the key is not what procedural
mechanism defendant chooses to raise the defense. Rather, the focus is
what plaintiff does once defendant raises the defense by whatever
mechanism. As discussed, once the defense is raised, plaintiff must
dismiss the action or risk sanction for later advocating the pleading for
an improper purpose. It is only where the defense is not obviously dis-
positive of the action that the choice of procedural mechanism is sig-
nificant. In such situation, however, sanctions would not be warranted
for filing the action.
CONCLUSION
While laudable as an effort to deter hopeless filings and preserve
court and party resources, treating a claim as legally or factually defi-
cient and subject to Rule 11 sanctions because of an affirmative defense
that a defendant may or may not assert constitutes a reordering of the
burdens of pleading as defined by the underlying substantive law. The
goal of deterrence can be better accomplished by judicially imposed
sanctions, not for factual or legal deficiency, but rather as a pleading as-
serted for an improper purpose. When a defense is obvious, that is,
when plaintiff has access to all information necessary to assess the
merits of the defense that plaintiff knows defendant will assert, there
can be no proper reason for filing a claim which has no chance of suc-
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made per-
tinent to such motion by Rule 56.
143. For example, in addition to the supporting materials referred to in FED. R. Civ. P.
56(e), a party seeking summary judgment in the Northern District of Illinois must also file a
supporting memorandum of law, a statement of uncontested facts that entitle the moving
party to a judgment as a matter of law, a description of the parties and a statement of facts
that support jurisdiction and venue. See RULES OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE NORTHERN DIsTRIcT OF ILLINOIS, LOCAL GENERAL RULE 12M. The party opposing the
motion must file its own supporting materials referred to in FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e), a support-
ing memorandum of law, a response to the movant's statement of uncontested facts and the
party's own statement of uncontested facts. See RULES OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, LOCAL GENERAL RULE 12N. The ultimate
decision would then await a reply brief from the moving party and the court's ruling.
144. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
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ceeding and court initiated Rule 11 sanctions should be imposed.
Where plaintiff does not know whether the defense will be raised and
files the action, sanctions should follow if the plaintiff refuses to im-
mediately dismiss the action once a dispositive affirmative defense is
asserted. With this approach, deterrence is accomplished and no one's
time is wasted by a plaintiff who refuses to accept the obvious. Most
importantly, a rule of procedure is not used to add to the elements of
plaintiff's prima facie case, and traditional burdens of pleading are pre-
served.
